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Abstract 
After decades of international intervention, the Democratic Republic of Congo still suffers 
from instability, political unrest, and corruption. The UN was brought into the country in order to 
bring security to the country’s citizens. However, MONUSCO’s missions have failed to bring 
sustainable results. This paper discusses the liberal peacebuilding theory, and its implementation 
by MONUSCO in the DRC, led by the question: to what extent have liberal peacebuilding 
practices used by MONUSCO produced paradoxical effects within the Democratic Republic of 
Congo?  
Through an analysis of MONUSCO’s SSR operations, this paper aims to identify the causal 
mechanisms through which paradoxical effects of liberal peacebuilding in the DRC are produced. 
This investigation was completed using a series of documents that explain MONUSCO’s mission 
for SSR, and interviews with peacebuilding professionals and experts. The data that was collected 
identified three causal mechanisms that lead to the production of paradoxical effects: the UN’s 
relationship with the DRC’s government, a legitimacy failure, and the UN’s mandate renewal 
system.  
This study will inform peacebuilding practitioners with ways in which paradoxical effects 
are produced by liberal peacebuilding methods, and how operations may be changed to produce 
sustainable results.  
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Introduction            
 
This thesis concerns itself with democratization as a central pillar of peace building in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, the Congo), and gives particular consideration to the United 
Nations’ (UN) mission of security sector reform (SSR). In 1997, the Congo was at a critical 
junction in the nation’s war-ridden history. At the dawn of the Second Congolese War, the country 
faced pervasive poverty, crippling corruption and several heavily armed warring factions 
(Soderlund, 2013). These conditions set the scene of former President Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s 
fatal shooting, which catalyzed a full-scale civil war. Now, the situation in the DRC is regarded as 
“one of the biggest headaches of the international community (Mortensen, 2013).” Joseph Kabila, 
the country’s current President, seized power over the country a mere ten days after his father was 
shot to death and has spent over a third of his life as President of the DRC. By remaining in power, 
he is surreptitiously plunging the Democratic Republic of Congo into a perpetual state of chaos 
(Sultan, 2017).  
The UN estimates that 8.74 billion USD has been spent to fund the peace operations within 
the country since 1999, with the total number of UN troops in the DRC estimated to be 
approximately 18,300 (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2016). Over thirty nations have 
contributed military and police personnel for the peacebuilding effort. Despite extensive 
international peacekeeping operations, armed groups continue to control large areas of the Kivu 
provinces, creating insecurity and preying on the population; the economy fails to develop, roads 
and other infrastructure projects remain dilapidated, and millions of people lack access to basic 
public services (International Alert, 2012). The lack of results presents a gap between the way in 
which liberal peacebuilding efforts are currently enacted by the UN and the sustainable results 
they aim to produce. This analysis is centered on the perforation between decades of peacebuilding 
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efforts and their results; it seeks to unveil the causal mechanisms through which paradoxical effects 
of liberal peacebuilding in the DRC are produced. As such, this study is led by the research 
question: to what extent have liberal peacebuilding practices used by United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) produced paradoxical 
effects within the Democratic Republic of Congo?  
	
Research Problem 
 
 The foregoing query arose during humanitarian worker Geoff Andrews’ speech on the 
current state of the DRC at the Humanity House in The Hague. During his speech, he spoke about 
the peacebuilding efforts used by the MONUSCO, and about the need for new insight into how 
peacebuilding efforts can be changed to create more sustainable results (G. Andrews, personal 
communication, February 15, 2018). Presently, there are countless accusations and problems of 
corruption that hamper development missions in the DRC; the “infamous interests of the 
international community in the Congo [are] often brought up as reasons for why the Congo seems 
to be stuck in cycles of violence and underdevelopment (De Goede, 2015, p.6).” 
The urgency for such an understanding of peacebuilding practices has existed since the 
United Nations Organization in the Congo (ONUC) was established in 1960. Despite consistent 
peacebuilding efforts, in October 2017 the UN labeled the Congo as emergency level ‘L3,’ which 
is only activated for the world’s most complex and challenging emergencies (Norwegian Refugee 
Council, 2017). This activation was placed after violence in Kasai, Tanganyika, and South Kivu 
displaced more than 2.5 million people, and after 4.3 million people were estimated to be facing 
emergency levels of food insecurity (International Organization of Migration, 2017). This 
sequence of events shows the overwhelming need to understand how peacebuilding operations 
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may be self-contradictory, and an even greater need to make these operations yield more 
sustainable results.  
The security sector reform (SSR), a portion of MONUSCO’s mandate, will be used as an 
area of analysis, because it is a crucial sight for liberal peacebuilding practices to be implemented, 
but also an activity that has been largely underrepresented and underfunded despite its importance 
to establishing peace (Ebo, 2007). Between 2006 and 2010, 530 million USD has been spent on 
SSR, which is a mere 6% of the total aid received by the DRC from the international community 
(Initiative, 2012). Aside from its role in the functioning of a stable and democratic security system, 
it also holds importance in a much bigger picture of the importance of human security, respect for 
human rights, and the rule of law (Tanin, 2007). The research proposed in this paper aims to add 
to a body of research that relates to liberal peacebuilding practices and their sustainability by 
concentrating on SSR, an institution that is considered to be of prime importance for a new 
democracy (Ebo, 2007). To do this, a critical lens is utilized to emphasize the need for the UN to 
focus on the extent to which liberal peacebuilding methods produce paradoxical effects. The 
results of this methodological analysis seek to further develop and improve the operationalization 
of liberal peacebuilding methods. 
The paper is structured as follows: first, literature on liberal peacebuilding theory will be 
introduced. This discourse examination will discuss how liberal peacebuilding is defined, and 
popular criticisms that accompany the theory. Subsequently, the theoretical framework will expand 
upon the liberal peacebuilding theory’s criticisms; three causal mechanisms by which paradoxical 
effects are brought into being will then be theorized. Following this, the methodological approach 
used to answer the research question will be explained and justified, accompanied by a motivation 
for this case selection. Lastly, the causal mechanisms brought forth within the theoretical 
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framework will be applied to the case of the Congo. This analysis is followed by a discussion of 
results, and future studies that concern liberal peacebuilding operations. 
	
Literature Review           
 
Pathologies of International Organizations 
 
International Organizations’ (IO) autonomy, according to sociological and constructivist 
theories, gives them the power to define shared international tasks, create and define new 
categories of actions, create new interests for actors and transfer models of political organization 
around the world (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). These characteristics, Barnett and Finnemore say, 
lead IOs to produce dysfunctional pathologies through several mechanisms. Drawing from their 
work, this thesis employs the word ‘paradoxical’ to describe the effects of IOs liberal 
peacebuilding operations that ostensibly contradict the main aims of the mission. The word 
‘paradoxical,’ is an adjective that is used to describe an event or statement that is self-contradictory 
or absurd (Merriam-Webster, 2018). In the case of peacebuilding operations, a mission may be 
considered to be paradoxical if it produces effects that contradict its intended goal.  
An example of this pathology can be seen in The United Nations Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL), which was established in 2003 to monitor a ceasefire agreement following the 
conclusion of the Second Liberian Civil War. Over 17,000 military, civilian, and civilian police 
personnel were deployed by the UN throughout the country to lessen the devastating effects on 
civilian populations (Thakur & De Coning, 2007). However, UN peacekeepers and humanitarian 
workers mandated to safeguard local populations in conflict zones were accused of systematic rape 
and sexual violence. The case in Liberia, amongst many others such as Somalia, Kosovo, and 
Haiti, demonstrates the unintended and paradoxical effects that accompany the implementation of 
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UN peacebuilding operations. Thereupon, this paper’s main goal is to disclose the ways in which 
MONUSCO’s liberal peace efforts create paradoxical effects that contradict their goals of 
providing sustainable security to civilians, and improving the security sector of the DRC.  
	
Traditional Peacebuilding Theory vs. Liberal Peacebuilding Theory 
Traditional Peacebuilding 
 
Despite the myriad of definitions pertaining to ‘peacebuilding’, there are varying opinions 
about what the term actually entails. ‘Peacebuilding’ is an applicable term that first emerged in 
1976 in John Galtung’s work, Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and 
Peacebuilding. His observations constitute the intellectual antecedents of today’s notion of 
peacebuilding: an endeavor that aims to create sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of 
conflict and eliciting indigenous capacities for peaceful management and resolution of conflict 
(Galtung, 1976).  
Peacebuilding’s definition has continued to evolve, whilst international actors have 
struggled to identify the critical ingredients and steps likely to further identify what 
institutionalizes peace after war. The UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali wrote An Agenda for 
Peace in 1992, which defined post-conflict peacebuilding as “action to identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992).” His paper stimulated new thinking in regard to peacebuilding both inside 
and outside of the UN by adding post-conflict peacebuilding to the international community’s 
toolkit (King & Matthews, 2012). A decade later, the Brahimi Report defined peacebuilding as 
“activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide 
the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war 
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(Brahimi, 2000).” This collection of definitions resembles the international community’s quest of 
understanding peacebuilding’s main components and objectives.  
	
Liberal Peacebuilding 
  
Contemporary peacebuilding approaches “reflect the idea that maintaining peace in post-
conflict societies requires a multi-faceted approach, with attention to a wide range of social, 
economic, and institutional needs. They reflect a liberal project (Richmond, 2009).” This genre of 
peacebuilding has been recognized as an attempt to construct democratic governance at the local 
level, and link it to an even more ambitious project of establishing democratic principles at the 
global level.  The result of this development has been labeled by scholars as liberal peacebuilding 
theory.  
Liberal peacebuilding is defined as “the promotion of democracy, market- based economic 
reforms and a range of other institutions associated with modern states as a driving force for 
building peace (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009).” Ultimately, the theory posits that 
democratic governance guarantees that domestic politics within states will be peaceful and stable. 
In addition to economic interdependence based on free trade, states are more inclined to comply 
to international law to resolve their disputes, and therefore have a greater respect for the rule of 
law and human rights (Richmond, 2014). 
This liberal evolution of peacebuilding approaches—institutionalized within the activities 
of the UN, smaller international agencies, financial institutions, NGOs, and other actors engaged 
in conflict environments—has opened the debate of the plausibility of outside forms of governance 
to mitigate and stabilize conflict. However, has also revived critiques of the liberal bodies engaged 
in such activities (Richmond, 2007).  
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Liberal Peacebuilding’s Criticisms 
 
As with any theory, the liberal peace is accompanied by an abundance of criticisms and 
problems. Three central themes of criticism, which have been extracted from the literature, will be 
discussed in the following sections. These critiques include its top-down structure, failure to 
legitimize itself with local actors, and one-dimensional approach.  
 
Top-Down Peacebuilding 
 
Social transformation aims to transform dysfunctional societies into peaceful societies by 
including them in the liberal world order using a graduation of top-down intervention. Top-down 
peacebuilding activity dominates through the conditional models and practices of organizations 
and institutions (Richmond, 2006). However, it is criticized that because top-down actors, such as 
the UN, are often empowered in writing the narrative of conflicts and transitions, they often 
overwrite narratives that people in conflict-affected areas use to describe their own reality (Tanabe, 
2017). 
Liberal peace agents often comprise the most powerful actors internationally and 
nationally, and so may be well placed to make sure that their narrative becomes hegemonic. The 
theory’s approach expects conflicted states to conform with the international system’s prevailing 
standards of domestic governance and “standards that frame how states should organize 
themselves internally despite the diversity and uniqueness of each post-conflict circumstance 
(Tanabe, 2017, p.450).” Thus, the liberal peace’s emphasis on top-down approaches has raised 
concerns about its viability and sustainability regarding peacebuilding, and has caused local 
critiques or even resistance to the failure to fulfill local needs (Richmond, 2011). 
	
Failure of Legitimization 
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 Moreover, the romanticisation of the local, has become a critique within liberal 
peacebuilding discourse (Tanabe, 2017; De Goede, 2015; Roberts, 2011). In Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding, Liberal Irrelevance and the Locus of Legitimacy, Roberts argues that the 
“legitimacy upon which peacebuilding, states, and peace rests cannot be generated by building 
institutions that ignore a population’s priorities and imminent needs and are irrelevant to conditions 
and contingencies as severe as those that routinely define post-conflict spaces. (Roberts, 2011, 
p.2).”  
However, it is suggested by critics of liberal peacebuilding theory that the moralistic and 
paternalistic thinking that has been integrated into operations is built upon romanticized notions, 
and has little attention for how such concepts are socially embedded and given meaning (Chabal 
& Daloz, 2006). This romanticized notion of the local places the creation of legitimacy from 
without, rather than within, the local context. Consequently, the liberal peace processes lack means 
of dialogues to render inclusion and participation sufficiently meaning to generate local legitimacy. 
	
Liberal Peace’s Linear Approach 
 
 The linear approach to peacebuilding is founded upon the belief that liberal peace is “the 
absolute framework that underpins universally stable peace (Tanabe, 2017, p.450).” However, 
conflict is a complex and non-linear phenomenon. The peacebuilding process is understood by the 
UN as a linear, cause-effect problem-solving model where experts are used to analyze a conflict, 
diagnose the problem, and address those causes through programmatic interventions. In this way, 
the UN and other international organizations have streamlined their peacebuilding processes and 
created programmatic intervention methods (Coning, 2016). The non-linearity component of 
conflicted states makes it incompatible with the UN’s linear systems, and raises criticism that 
liberal peace is unable to understand the complexities of conflict.  
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 The literature that has been presented within this section focuses on the pathologies of IOs, 
and liberal peacebuilding theory’s central criticisms. However, a deeper examination of the 
mechanisms that connect IOs’ liberal peacebuilding initiatives to paradoxical effects within 
subsections of UN operations, such as SSR, has not yet been conducted for the Congo’s particular 
case. As such, this paper inspects three mechanisms through which paradoxical effects may, or 
may not, be brought into being by liberal peace missions: the UN’s top-down relationship with the 
DRC’s government, failure to legitimize locally, and linear approach. By doing so, this inspection 
will add to existing literature on the efficacy of liberal peacebuilding operations.  
Theoretical Framework          
 
This section seeks to expand upon theoretical insights of liberal peacebuilding literature, 
and will introduce the mechanisms that will be used to answer the question:  
 
To what extent have liberal peacebuilding practices used by MONUSCO produced 
paradoxical effects within the Democratic Republic of Congo? 
 
The criticisms that appear within liberal peacebuilding literature are operationalized within 
the UN’s top-down relationship with the host country, their inability to legitimize themselves to 
the local population, and in their linear, one-dimensional approach to conflict. Within this section, 
each mechanism will be individually theorized in order to measure the ways in which paradoxical 
effects are generated within liberal peacebuilding operations.  
	
Top-Down Approaches: Analyzing the UN’s Relationships with Conflicted States  
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 The literature’s criticisms of liberal peace operations argue that paradoxical effects appear 
in the top-down relationship between the UN mission and the government where the mission 
operates (De Goede, 2015; Tanabe, 2017). Richmond posits that, as international actors intervene 
in the conflicts of other states, the opportunity to establish epistemic communities filled with states, 
donors, agencies, international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations arises. 
Consequently, governance becomes both a tool and goal with liberal peace and creates a multilevel 
governance framework that is “open to co-option by its dominant sponsors and donors (Richmond, 
2010).” The balance of power that is sought by international actors converges in liberal 
peacebuilding practices and creates an environment for enforcement, hegemonic governance or 
coercive domination. This convergence results in the implementation of liberal peace being 
transferred by force, coercion, conditionality or dependency that marginalizes the individual and 
gives institutions “a life of their own (Richmond, 2010).” 
An example of paradoxical effects produced by IOs through this mechanism can be seen 
within the case of Afghanistan. In 2008, an official publication prepared by Oxfam International 
presented an analysis of a security study that reviewed existing peacebuilding projects by Oxfam 
and other IOs currently deployed throughout the country. The report’s findings lamented the 
failure of existing strategies to promote peace, because the organization focused its functions at 
the national or international level, despite insecurity, disputes and problems being locally charged 
(Waldman, 2008). Using the example of aid modalities, the report argues that technical assistance 
funds intended to support government capacity building were distributed heavily at the state level, 
and failed to have an effect on local capacity building (Waldman, 2008).  
This aforementioned example shows that the establishment of far-reaching, top-down 
liberal peacebuilding interventions privilege the state and its institutions above people and 
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communities, and ignored how local people in conflict-affected areas describe their reality, needs, 
and cultures. (Heathershaw, 2008; Richmond, 2011). Examples such as this highlight the need to 
reconsider contemporary peacebuilding approaches, in order to ensure those most affected by 
conflict benefit from liberal peacebuilding efforts. 
	
Failing to Legitimize 
 
 Legitimacy of peace operations from the perspective of populations of states that receive 
them is imperative to the understanding of the effectiveness and success of peacebuilding 
operations (Whalan, 2017). The 2015 High-Level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report 
recommends that by actively including local people, missions are able to monitor and respond to 
how local people experience the impact of peace operations. However, criticisms point to lack of 
local legitimacy as one of the keys to understanding why peace does not prevail as intended 
(Roberts, 2011). The romanticization of the local population, whereby outside actors ascribe 
benign characteristics to local communities, places the legitimacy of peacebuilding outside of the 
local context (Mac Ginty, 2015). In other words, despite liberal peacebuilding’s claim to be 
democratic, local civilians are not considered throughout the liberal peace dialogue. In this way, 
this mechanism can be seen to produce paradoxical effects because it fails to render meaningful 
inclusion and participation from local populations.   
 The UN’s failure to legitimize themselves can also be theorized using apparatuses provided 
by Barnett and Finnemore. Organizational insulation suggests that IOs insulate themselves from 
feedback, and develop worldviews that do not promote the goals and expectations of those outside 
the organization (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). The absence of effective feedback loops that 
allow the IO to evaluate its efforts, and use new information to correct established routines, causes 
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IOs to insulate themselves. Consequently, the insulation produces paradoxical, and pathological 
behavior by creating a world-view that is illegitimate from the view of the local population.  
For example, the World Bank has accumulated a long record of failures, yet continues to 
use the same operating criteria. The organization’s unwillingness to revise their practices is a 
characteristic that is shared by many IOs and agencies, including the UN (Barnett and Finnemore, 
1999). However, the World Bank’s paucity to procure evaluations that measure the effectiveness 
of their own projects shows how IO behavior further illegitimates and insulates themselves from 
the goals and expectations of those outside of the organization, thus excluding them from the 
framework of IOs’ peacebuilding operations.  
	
Liberal Peace’s Linear Approach 
 
Liberal peacebuilding’s practitioners believe that liberal peace is a framework that 
predicates peace, and is thus implemented as an approach to bring a lasting peace across different 
contexts of conflicted societies (Tanabe, 2017). Universalism, a mechanism by which IO culture 
can breed self-contradictory behavior, can be applied to this criticism. The dominant forms of 
interventions led by states and institutions in the West have rested on notions of universalism. 
Liberal universalism, for example, suggests that certain ideals, such as human rights and 
democratic values should apply for all people at any time; it is a “normative claim that the 
international community should strive to implement them on a universal basis (Langlois, 2007, 
p.345).” However, this strive to match the West’s notion of democracy debases the diversity and 
technicality associated with different peacebuilding operations (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013).  
IOs have been criticized for their proclivity to flatten diversity, and instead generate 
universal rules and categories that are inattentive to contextual and particularistic concerns 
(Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Thus, IOs believe that technical knowledge regarding liberal peace 
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theory can be applied to different circumstances. Instances of universalism producing paradoxical 
effects exist. In many instances, peacekeepers that work in a specific conflict-zone are transferred 
to other locations; the knowledge gained in one location is assumed to be suitable for other 
operations. However, “although some technical skills can be transferred across contexts, not all 
knowledge and organizational lessons derived from one context and appropriate elsewhere 
(Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, p. 721).” This practice of technical knowledge transference 
produces unintended consequences, because it fails to re-generate rules and practices that are 
attentive to new contexts and circumstantial concerns. These preceding mechanisms will be used 
to test the main hypothesis of this paper, which states:  
 
If MONUSCO’s liberal peacebuilding operation has a top-down relationship with 
the DRC’s government, fails to legitimize itself within the local context, and uses a 
one-dimensional approach to reform the DRC’s security sector, then paradoxical 
effects will be produced. 
 
This main hypothesis is supplemented by smaller elements found within the literature: if 
IOs use a top-down approach, then the local population will be disempowered throughout the 
peacebuilding process. Additionally, IOs will continue to experience issues with sustaining peace, 
unless they incorporate the local population within their operating framework. These claims will 
be tested within the subsequent sections of this paper; the apparatuses will be applied to the case 
of the Congo in order to support, or deny, this central hypothesis.   
 
Methodology            
Case Selection  
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MONUSCO is the UN’s biggest and most expensive peacekeeping operation, currently 
comprising approximately 17,000 military personnel, 1,500 police officers, and 3,500 civilians 
(International Peace Institute, 2018). Since 2017, the situation in the Congo has expanded and 
become more challenging; Congolese civilians are perpetually plagued by reprisals of armed 
groups, government corruption, and a lack of basic resources. Consequently, the number of 
internally displaced people within the DRC has skyrocketed to 3.7 million in the Kasais region of 
the country (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2017).  
The Congo’s aptitude to reproduce conflict, in defiance of international intervention, makes 
this country a nucleus for peacebuilding discourse. Most importantly, the DRC can be used by 
scholars as a case for peacebuilding operation reform (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The UN has 
warned that the current situation in the Congo has reached a breaking point; the country has 
experienced a relapse of heightened conflict and corruption in the face of heavy international 
intervention (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017). Thus, this 
country’s case provides a substantive and unique case that can be used to critically analyze liberal 
peace operations and the unintended effects that they produce. For these reasons, I have chosen to 
use the crisis in the DRC for this study.  
Methodological Approach 
 
As mentioned previously, if it is observed that the UN utilizes a top-down relationship with 
the DRC’s government, fails to legitimize their operations with locals, and uses a linear approach, 
then I expect that MONUSCO’s operations will yield paradoxical effects. As previously 
mentioned, the word paradoxical is used to describe the unintended effects of IOs’ liberal 
peacebuilding operations that ostensibly contradict the main aims of the mission. The empirical 
data used to test this hypothesis will be collected by evaluating selected documents and by 
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analyzing the interviews that were conducted with consultants and peacebuilders currently 
commissioned in the DRC. Collectively, these methods will be used to identify whether the three 
causal mechanisms developed in the literature exist within MONUSCO’s SSR operation, thus 
producing paradoxical effects.  
This paper employs document analysis to collect data for various reasons, the first being 
that the literature consulted throughout the data collection process was able to provide a vast array 
of data and information for consideration that would have otherwise been impossible to collect on 
an individual basis. By considering the reports of other organizations and institutes, limitations 
such as lack of time and resources were overcome.  
During the course of my analysis, I sought to understand the UN’s approach to SSR in the 
DRC by examining UNSC resolution 2348 (2017) and Securing Peace and Development: the role 
of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform (UN Secretary-General, 2008). In 
addition, MONUSCO at a Glance, which was produced by the Strategic Communications and 
Public Information Division in 2018, served as a basis for analyzing the mission’s present goals. 
To further substantiate my findings, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on 
Security Sector Reform, a report produced by a group of international and Congolese organizations 
that give SSR recommendations to the DRC’s Government, was used. A second report, Supporting 
SSR in the DRC: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, assembled by the Institute for Security Studies 
in South Africa and the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in The Netherlands, gives 
an extensive overview of approaches taken to reform the justice, police, and defense sector of the 
DRC. Although this report focuses on state actors and their respective SSR missions, it 
nevertheless provides credible insight into ways in which the West has approached SSR in the 
DRC.  
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To supplement the literature analysis, seven semi-structured interviews with experts and 
employees from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), IOs, and agencies commissioned by the 
UN to carry out peacebuilding operations were conducted. The interviews were used as part of the 
data collection method because they facilitate obtaining direct explanations for human actions 
through comprehensive social interaction. Thus, each interviewee’s technological background was 
carefully considered as a means to provide an opportunity to learn more about the rich details of 
each person’s personal experiences and expertise. 
The International Cooperation Agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities 
(VNG International), is an organization that has aligned themselves with the ‘International 
Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS, I4S)’, the joint strategy for Eastern Congo, 
aimed at bringing UN agencies, donors, MONUSCO, and international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) together around a joint agenda. During the interview process, I spoke with 
several staff members from the organization’s office in The Hague about the Consortium for the 
Integrated Stabilization and Peace of Eastern DRC. Their direct involvement in establishing an 
effective security reform agenda, as well as their work alongside other NGOs and IOs to make 
democratic dialogue programs more effective, proved to be an invaluable source of information 
for peacebuilding program pitfalls and weaknesses.  
 Two independent consultants were also contacted during the interview process: Kris 
Berwouts and Hans Romkema. Berwouts is an independent analyst and acknowledged expert on 
the DRC. Until 2012, he was the director of the European NGO network for advocacy on Central 
Africa (EurAc). His book, Congo’s Violent Peace, is a comprehensive account of the DRC’s post-
war history and its current political situation. His expertise brought awareness to the contradictory 
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relationship that the UN has with the DRC’s government, and the silent distrust that exists between 
MONUSCO workers and the Congolese men and women they encountered through their work. 
 Hans Romkema is an expert on conflict resolutions and peacebuilding in Africa. His work, 
Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups 
in the DRC, shed light on the demobilization and reintegration processes (D&R) that exist within 
the country. Thus, he was able to provide information about the current state of security and 
personal insight to the ways in which the country, and international partners, can move towards 
peace and stability.  
 Jordan Anderson, who is an Analyst and Africa Specialist that specializes in Country Risk 
analysis, was interviewed about the current security situation in the DRC. His expertise was crucial 
to understanding the amount of corruption that exists within the Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), police force, and justice systems. Additionally, he provided 
insight to the state of armed groups, their current active locations, and the relationship that they 
have with the current government.  
 Lastly, I had the opportunity to interview Peter Bos, a program manager for WarChild 
Holland that is currently stationed in Bukavu. Warchild Holland is an international NGO that 
empowers children and young people that have been affected by conflict. During our interview, 
Bos spoke about his experiences working within the DRC, and the problems that humanitarian 
organizations encounter on a daily basis. Most importantly, he shed light on the presence of 
international organizations within all parts of the country, including the mentality of the local 
people and government towards the presence of peacebuilders.  
 Due to the diverse backgrounds of interviewees, interviews brought forth compelling 
information about the state of the security sector in the Congo, the relationship that exists between 
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the UN and the Government of the DRC, and about the people most affected by conflict and 
instability. Conclusively, their insight gave this paper more ground to identify the causal 
mechanisms that produce paradoxical effects in liberal peace operations. The discussions also 
served as a complementary tool to understanding the criticisms, suggestions, and approaches that 
were uncovered during the analysis of literature that took place in the abovementioned sources.  
In the next section, I will discuss the main findings that were produced by applying the 
causal mechanisms identified within the theoretical framework collectively analyzing and 
synthesizing the information that was provided to me by these documents and discussions.  
 
Results and Analysis           
The subsequent analysis will converge the causal mechanisms identified in previous 
sections with MONUSCO’s SSR activities. Ultimately, this segment seeks to identify whether the 
three causal mechanisms are present within the case of the DRC, thus creating paradoxical effects.  
This section begins with an introduction to MONUSCO’s SSR operation. Subsequently, 
the four main aims of UNSC resolution 2348 (S/RES/2348), which extensively outlines the SSR 
mission of MONUSCO, will be summarized. Then, the three causal mechanisms which were 
introduced in the theoretical framework will be applied to the case of the Congo in order to 
determine the extent to which paradoxical effects are produced. 
	
MONUSCO’s Security Sector Reform Mission 
The institutionalization of liberal peacebuilding in the DRC has taken form through 
MONUSCO. Its mandate includes: (1) permission to use means necessary to protect civilians, 
humanitarian personnel, and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence; 
and (2) to support the government of the DRC in its stabilization efforts (S/RES/1925). The 
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necessary means may include, but are not limited to, utilizing physical protection units, human 
rights monitoring systems, and political advocacy strategies (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). 
This paper brings particular focus to MONUSCO’s SSR activities, which seek to reform the DRC’s 
justice support system, political affairs, human rights, and security sector, amongst other activities.   
The term “security sector” is a broad term used to describe the structures, institutions and 
personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country (United 
Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). SSR maintains its importance within international relations because 
it strengthens justice and security institutions that are responsive to the needs of all individuals, 
and which build trust and promote social cohesion (UN Document A/59/565). The Un has 
emphasized the significance of a comprehensive approach to security for sustainable peace; it 
draws attention to the need for supporting national actors and approaches that bring together 
judicial, penal, and human rights, as well as policing experts, in order to have an impact on 
sustainable peace and security within the country. 
In the case of the DRC, the UN has been requested to aid the Government in the area of 
SSR and capacity-building in the area of military justice. MONUSCO’s most recent mandate is 
outlined in UNSC Resolution 2348 (2017); this resolution authorizes the mission to work with the 
Government of the DRC in the reform of the police, to encourage and accelerate national 
ownership of SSR by the Government of the DRC, for army reform that would enhance its 
accountability, efficiency, and training, and for the implementation of any appropriate 
recommendations for justice and prison sector reforms as contained in the final report of the Etats 
Généraux de la Justice (UNSC 2348, 2017).  
 MONUSCO’s presence has undoubtedly changed the atmosphere of the DRC. UN 
volunteers constitute over a third of the international personnel in MONUSCO. In many ways, the 
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organization has helped bring a sense of comfort to citizens, and have made it impossible for the 
greater international community to ignore the violence that is happening within the country (P. 
Bos, personal communication). However, their activities relative to SSR have been unable to 
fortify themselves into sustainable, peaceful results. 
	
UNSC Resolution 2348 (2017) 
The DRC’s current situation is one that is unique to the peacebuilding community: it is a 
country with a vast amount of natural resources, that has been occupied with international 
organizations and actors for decades with no sign of peace in the near future (International Alert, 
2012). Researchers from the Clingendael institute posit that the DRC’s need for reform of the 
security sector and the state’s capacity to reform are inversely proportional, due partly to the rise 
in conflict between rebel groups and the Government’s inability to accept donor interventions 
(Boshoff et al., 2010). At the end of 2007, the ‘Justice Reform Action Plan’ was presented at the 
SSR Round Table and contained four main aims: universal access to justice, the establishment of 
the legal and constitutional framework of justice, combating corruption and impunity, and the 
promotion of human rights. These four goals are present in UNSC Resolution 2348 (2017) and 
include four main areas within which MONUSCO would work with the Government of the DRC 
to reform the security sector. These include: 
 
(a) in the reform of the police, including by assisting the Comité de réforme de la 
police, and by advocating for the establishment of the Secrétariat Général à la sécurité et à l’ordre 
public that will coordinate security institutions with a law enforcement mission; 
(b) to encourage and accelerate national ownership of SSR by the Government of the 
DRC, including through the development of a common national vision, to be encapsulated in a 
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national security policy, as well as a clear and comprehensive SSR implementation roadmap 
including benchmarks and timelines, and play a leading role in coordinating the support for SSR 
provided by international and bilateral partners and the United Nations system; 
(c) in compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), for army 
reform that would enhance its accountability, efficiency, self-sustainability, training, vetting and 
effectiveness, while noting that any support provided by the United Nations, including in the form 
of rations and fuel, should be for joint operations and subject to appropriate oversight and scrutiny; 
(d) for the implementation of any appropriate recommendations for justice and prison 
sector reforms as contained in the final report of the Etats généraux de la Justice, including on the 
fight against impunity, for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, in order to develop 
independent, accountable and functioning justice and security institutions. 
 
Throughout the various reports and documents that were consulted, as well as through a 
multitude of interviews conducted with practitioners from international organizations and experts 
on the DRC, three main causal mechanisms that link liberal peacebuilding theory to the production 
of paradoxical effects have appeared. First, there is deep criticism on the relationship that 
MONUSCO has with the Government of the DRC (Berwouts, personal communication, April 18, 
2018). Secondly, the inability of outside actors to understand the contextual issues that the 
Congolese people experience has brought criticism and concern to liberal peace operations 
(Berwouts, personal communication, April 18, 2018). Lastly, the UN’s one-dimensional approach 
institutionalized in the yearly mandate and budget renewal by the UN has caused alarm, and is 
seen to harm the overall mission of MONUSCO (Coleman, 2017). These three mechanisms are to 
be expanded upon within the following sections.  
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The UN’s Relationship with the DRC: SSR Nationalization and Reform 
Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a Rock and a Hard Place, highlights the consensus 
that progress in the area of SSR has been limited in the DRC. One of the reasons for this lack of 
progress is the inability and unwillingness of the DRC’s government to create an effective security 
sector. Their report states that the Congolese State is unable to fulfill basic sovereign 
responsibilities and that its governance system is highly autocratic with political power 
concentrated in the Presidency (Boshoff et al., 2010). The security sector of the DRC is comprised 
of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), the Congolese National 
Police (PNC), and the Presidential Guard and Intelligence Services (Agence Nationale de 
Renseignements, ANR). Despite the multitude of SSR framework suggestions by outside states 
and IOs, the DRC’s security sector is still structured to protect the Government’s elite population 
(International Crisis Group, 2006; Boshoff et al., 2010). 
The present political climate in the DRC is characterized by illegitimacy and corruption. 
Following President Kabila’s refusal to step down from the Presidency in early December 2016, 
when his Presidential mandate had ended, the people of the Congo began to organize protests to 
end Kabila’s 17-year rule. During political protests that took place in Kinshasa, the nation’s capital, 
the FARDC cracked down on regime opponents and were reported to have killed more than 59 
citizens. This example explicitly demonstrates the systematic corruption that exists within the 
DRC’s security sector, and the loyalties that the police sector have to the Kabila regime. 
Despite this engrained allegiance, the DRC’s government fails to pay its soldiers on a 
regular basis, which forces them to find other means to support themselves and their families 
(Anderson, personal communication, 9 May 2018). Jordan Anderson shed light on the irregular 
payment of the military and how this has led members of the FARDC to make civilians pay 
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soldiers’ salaries by way of extortion at illegal road blocks (Anderson, personal communication, 9 
May 2018). Despite this evidence, the UN maintains a top-down strategy that aims to further 
nationalize SSR and its constitutive institutions, which inadvertently puts more power into the 
hands of a government that propels security sector dysfunction and corruption. This further 
perpetuates the ability of state-run institutions to harbor dysfunction, further disadvantaging the 
local population, which is contradictory to the main tenets of UN-led liberal peace operations.  
Within UNSC resolution 2348 (2017), one of the main pathways to achieving SSR is 
nationalizing its processes; this principle places MONUSCO’s focus at the state level. In the 
context of liberal peacebuilding theory, the nationalization of the DRC’s security sector under a 
government that recognizes human rights and the rule of law is necessary for the establishment of 
a fully functioning liberal democracy; however, evidence produced by the UNJHRO shows the 
Government and its security agencies are unable to respect international human rights and the rule 
of law. The Constitution states that the police force is independent, impartial and accountable. 
Nonetheless, the partisanship that the police has with the Kabila regime is persistent, which makes 
the relationship between police and citizens of the DRC highly tumultuous. Thus, the processes 
that are currently being enacted by MONUSCO are actively working to give more ownership over 
the justice, police, and defense sector to President Kabila and his appointed officials, many of 
whom have their own history of human rights abuses and corruption.  
In an interview with Kris Berwouts, he spoke about the presence of this contradictory 
relationship, and its persistence every time experts, scholars, and practitioners speak about 
MONUSCO. The UN is an international body that was invited by the Government, and must work 
closely with its officials to implement their own SSR strategies, thus focusing efforts at the state 
level. As a result, the state is privileged above people and communities that suffer at the hands of 
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the DRC’s current government and its institutions. Berwouts states that during his time working 
for MONUSCO he quickly realized, “[Peacebuilders] are there because the government invited 
you, and must work together with people that are considered much more part of the problem than 
part of the solution (Berwouts, personal communication, 19 April 2018).” This quotation does 
much more than summarize the relationship that currently exists between the UN and the DRC’s 
government in regard to SSR; the excerpt shows that liberal peacebuilding efforts, institutionalized 
through MONUSCO’s activities, produce paradoxical effects that give greater privilege to the 
Kabila regime and its corrupt institutions, and marginalizes individuals by continuing to work with 
a corrupt government to coordinate their peacebuilding and SSR efforts. 
	
Liberal Peacebuilding’s Legitimacy Failure 
Liberal peacebuilding literature suggests that the effectiveness and success of 
peacebuilding operations is reliant upon the operation’s legitimacy in the eyes of the local 
population (Whalan, 2017; Tanabe, 2017). The three security sector agencies present within the 
DRC have an inherent relationship with the Kabila regime. In many cases, military generals, 
provincial leaders, and other cabinet positions are filled by those men and women that are loyal to 
Kabila and his family, and that are comfortable exploiting state resources for the prosperity of the 
regime (Anderson, Personal Communication, 9 May 2018). This structure, and the composition of 
the DRC’s governance and military system is one that is unfamiliar to the West. Within liberal 
peace practices, a system of ‘good governance,’ constructed in Western culture, is transposed to 
the African context; this Western idea of peace promotes norms and practices that are at variance 
with local notions of peace, contributing to persistent insecurity after peacebuilding is instituted 
(Naidu and Makanda, 2015).  
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In my interview with Jan-Maarten van Westen, he spoke about the presence of the Congo’s 
neopatrimonial governance structure; neopatrimonialism is a system of social hierarchy where 
patrons use state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population 
(Eisenstadt, 1973). Neopatrimonialism is prevalent in Africa, because African regimes are 
presidential and situate their power within one person’s reign (Van de Walle, 2005). This, in turn 
creates a form of ‘clientelism’ wherein men and women in office appropriate public resources for 
their private benefit. The neopatrimonial nature of African regimes, such as Kabila’s presidency 
in the DRC, make it difficult for liberal peacebuilding practices to attain legitimacy within the 
country’s government system and local population.  
MONUSCO’s approach to SSR has been insufficient in dealing with the neopatrimonial 
structure that is present in the current justice, police, and defense sectors. In MONUSCO’s 
February 2018 report their military, police, and justice reform priorities were listed. These 
priorities include the training of court officers, the rehabilitation of police stations, and the 
construction of military training facilities. Following the outline of the UN’s SSR framework, it is 
seen that MONUSCO’s main aims are constructed outside of the provincial context, with little 
evidence to show that local populations’ needs and insights were considered; furthermore, it shows 
MONUSCO’s failure to render inclusive discussions with the local people and context of regional 
issues. Ergo, by constructing the legitimacy of peacebuilding operations outside of the local 
context, liberal peace’s goal of democratic inclusivity is contradicted, thus affecting the 
sustainability of SSR efforts.  
In addition, legitimacy is difficult to attain because many UN troops are organizationally 
insulated from the local population’s worldview. The difficulties of implementing peacebuilding 
operations stem, in part, from the inability of the organization’s workers to grasp the goals and 
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expectations of those outside the organization (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). The operation 
assesses the causes of its own failures, but falls short of implementing a new operational 
framework that adheres to the intricacy of local needs. The actions by MONUSCO in this regard 
produce, as Barnett and Finnemore argue, a dysfunctional pathology by organizationally insulating 
themselves from the local (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999).  
An additional challenge to legitimizing SSR efforts is the disconnect between MONUSCO 
workers and the Congolese people. Berwouts describes the UN’s mission as “an artificial 
peninsula” of knowledge and expertise (Kris Berwouts, personal communication, 19 April 2018). 
In many cases, workers are unwilling or unable to connect and integrate themselves with the 
Congolese people, thus creating a disparate view of the legitimacy and efficacy of peacebuilding 
operations.  
Additionally, paradoxical effects are produced by the UN’s failure to legitimize within the 
local context because troops that constitute much of MONUSCO’s forces come from countries 
such as India, Pakistan, and the South African Republic. In many instances, these UN 
peacebuilders are transplanted in the Congo from other peace operations, and struggle to develop 
congruent goals and expectations with those of the local population. In 2007, the BBC released a 
report that Pakistani UN peacekeeping troops traded in gold and sold weapons to Congolese militia 
groups they were meant to disarm (BBC News, 2007). To such a degree, the disassociation 
between peacebuilders and the people they are commissioned to protect produces paradoxical 
effects that contradict the main goals outlined in MONUSCO’s operational framework.  
	
MONUSCO’s Yearly Mandate: A failure to Understand the Congo’s Complexity 
 Each year, the UNSC organizes its liberal peacebuilding efforts in the form of a renewed 
mandate for MONUSCO; this approach is seen as being one-dimensional because it fails to allow 
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the organization to apply a unique technical approach to SSR operations and peacebuilding efforts. 
The Council decided in its original 2010 mandate that MONUSCO would be reconfigured in 
response to the evolution of ground operations, military operations in North and South Kivu, 
improved government capacity to protect the population, and the consolidation of State authority. 
Despite the Congo’s unique security situation, the SSR framework is strikingly similar with those 
of other operations throughout the world. Yet, each year the UNSC provides recommendations to 
the government of the DRC, and establishes a new budget for the forthcoming year.  
 The regeneration of MONUSCO’s mandate is institutionalized within the UNSC and its 
liberal system; however, this resumption process leads to much bigger issues and produces 
paradoxical effects that harm the mandate’s success. The Security Council’s intention to revitalize 
MONUSCO’s mandate on a yearly basis has made it impossible for long-term SSR plans to be 
established, fails to adjust to the complexity of each situation, and has contributed to a negative 
atmosphere amongst international organizations.  
An example of how paradoxical effects are produced by this approach is seen in a report 
made by the UN in 2014, where the need for a ‘clear exit strategy’ from the Congo was 
emphasized. The same area of emphasis has been made in multiple UNSC Resolutions, which 
further highlights the necessity of a clear exit strategy (see, for example, UNSC Res. 2348, 2147). 
Due to its yearly mandate renewal, smaller agencies and coordinating bodies that carry out SSR 
activities are unable to carry out missions with longevity in mind. As a previous worker for 
MONUSCO, Berwouts exposed the paradoxical effects of this yearly mandate renewal, saying, “if 
there is a mandate extension of one year at a time, then all coordinating bodies plan on a yearly 
basis, and are unable to tackle greater, more complex issues (Kris Berwouts, personal 
communication 19 April 2018).” This case illustrates that paradoxical effects created by 
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MONUSCO’s shallow, yearly mandate renewal inhibit the production of long-term solutions and 
strategies to SSR. 
	 Following this case,	it should be recognized that the UN has nine peace operations that 
include a SSR mandate. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) assists in the reform 
of individual security components, such as police services. However, each of the UN’s SSR 
operations follow the same operational recommendations: centrality of national ownership, the 
need for integrated and coherent support to national SSR efforts, importance of both sector-wide 
and component-level assistance, and concept of SSR as both a technical and political process 
(United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). Thus, the UN aims to apply universal technical knowledge 
regarding SSR to different circumstances, which causes paradoxical effects such as the debasement 
of diversity and technicality associated with different peacebuilding operations (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 1999; Richmond, 2013) 
In addition to these observations, the UN’s linear approach creates a competitive mindset 
that takes form between MONUSCO’s activities and agencies that help carry out MONUSCO’s 
mandate; this negative organizational culture limits the successes of liberal peace operations within 
the DRC. The UN General Assembly approved 6.8 billion USD for peacekeeping expenditures for 
the 2017/18 budget year. However, states agreed on only the first six months of funding. 
MONUSCO, the UN’s largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations, has a 2017/18 budget 
of 1.14 billion USD, which is an 8% reduction from the previous year (Norwegian Refugee 
Council, 2017). The constant budget reductions, which are inversely proportional to MONUSCO’s 
expansion of tasks and challenges, have created a self-destructive pathology.  
During an interview with Peter Bos, a humanitarian worker from WarChild Holland, 
currently stationed in Bukavu, he spoke about the competitive attitude that has taken shape 
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between and within organizations for resources and funding. In many instances, organizations will 
seek to increase their relevancy and degrade other activities in order to compete for limited 
resources and relevancy. This competitive atmosphere materializes in many ways. Most notably, 
Bos spoke about signs on aid packages and equipment that state which organization each of the 
resources came from. This creates an emulous atmosphere, wherein organizations compete for 
resources on a yearly basis to ensure their own survival (Peter Bos, personal communication, 3 
May 2018). The effects of this competitive atmosphere on the success of peacebuilding operations 
can become insurmountable, and can create a type of ‘tunnel vision’ by organizations to sustain 
themselves. This same process, Berwouts says, happens within MONUSCO, and makes it difficult 
for the organization to sustain its goals and collective approach, thereby leaving crucial 
peacebuilding efforts unstable and incongruent with one another.  
 On the far side of this mandate renewal problem, the citizens of the Congo have developed 
an attitude of reliance on international actors and organizations; the local population and 
government have learned to rely on IOs for their basic needs and security. This shift in dependence 
is an additional paradoxical effect that not only results from MONUSCO’s longstanding presence, 
but also the habitation of organizations such as Doctors Without Borders (MSF), the IMF, and 
smaller coordinating agencies. Liberal peacebuilding actors have inserted themselves into the 
constituting fibers of society, and made it impossible for the government to function 
independently; this is seen as an additional unintended effect of MONUSCO’s deep-rooted 
peacebuilding operations. 
 
Conclusion             
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 This paper attempts to close the perforation between MONUSCO’s peacebuilding efforts 
and their results in reforming the security sector of the DRC; it seeks to unveil the causal 
mechanisms through which paradoxical effects of liberal peacebuilding in the DRC are produced. 
To do this, empirical evidence was collected through literature and interviews with peacebuilding 
workers. Three causal mechanisms, which were identified throughout liberal peacebuilding 
literature, were then used as measurements to determine the extent of paradoxical effects produced 
by MONUSCO’s liberal peace operation. This section summarizes this study’s findings, and 
discusses its future implications.   
 
Summary of Findings 
The criticisms that were introduced within the literature on liberal peacebuilding: the 
liberal peace’s top-down approach, its inability to understand the locale, and failure to adapt to the 
complexities of individual cases have materialized in MONUSCO’s SSR operations. First, there 
is significant evidence that shows the relationship that MONUSCO has with the Government of 
the DRC is detrimental to the success that MONUSCO has within the country. The UN’s 
institutionalized approach forces itself into a relationship with the Kabila regime to accomplish its 
goals. By working with the regime, the UN privileges Kabila’s leadership and power over the 
needs of civilians.  
Secondly, the liberal peace’s tendency to construct liberal peace operations outside of the 
local context makes it difficult for the mission to gain legitimacy within the provincial level. 
Transplanting Western governance structures onto developing nations delegitimizes the UN’s 
operation in the eyes of civilians—those that fall victim to the security sector’s corruption. The 
use of such an approach is self-contradictory to the liberal peace’s tenet of democratic inclusivity, 
and makes it more challenging to create sustainable results throughout the country. This 
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observation follows the criticisms made by other authors: liberal peacebuilding fails in the Congo 
due to the mission’s inability to appreciate, understand and respond to the local context (Mathe 
2007 and Tull, 2009).  
Lastly, the yearly mandate renewal by the UN has made the mission unable to adapt to the 
Congo’s provincial complexities. By working on a yearly basis, the peacebuilding mission is 
unable to cultivate long-term, sustainable results. This conclusion is further enforced in multiple 
interviews; peacebuilding practitioners and experts were able to quickly recognize the effects of 
MONUSCO’s near-sighted operability and yearly mandate renewal. Thus, the UN’s efforts to 
create institutions within the security sector and nationalize its processes from year-to-year 
struggles to adapt to the breadth of the Congo’s needs (Tull, 2009). 
	
Discussion: The Future of Peacebuilding Operations 
There is no question that the efforts by the UN have altered the environment of the Congo. 
Peter Bos and Jordan Anderson spoke about the presence of UN trucks, blue helmets, and 
humanitarian aid that exist within the country. However, it is natural to question the bigger picture 
of liberal peace and the effects that the UN’s presence brings with it. Are the actions of the UN 
keeping an illegitimate, dictatorial leader in power by giving him legitimacy in the eyes of the 
international community? Is there a better way to bring sustainable peace to the DRC? And, as 
scholars look to the future of the country: when, if ever, will the UN be able to leave the Congo? 
The answers to these questions are still being examined by academics around the world.  
This paper took a critical stance on the use of liberal peacebuilding practices used by 
MONUSCO in the DRC’s SSR operation as a vehicle for producing paradoxical effects. During 
the course of interviewing experts and peacebuilding practitioners, one very apparent limitation 
made itself evident: I was unable to go to the DRC and speak to men and women, and see for 
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myself MONUSCO’s presence within the country. However, this limitation was compensated for 
in various ways. I was lucky enough to speak with incredible people that have lived, worked, and 
visited multiple areas of the Congo, and seen the work of MONUSCO on a firsthand basis. The 
interviewees’ stories, insight, and explanations gave information that was necessary to understand 
the scope of MONUSCO’s efforts. Other limitations that were taken into consideration were the 
types of people I was able to contact and speak with. Unfortunately, MONUSCO’s SSR offices 
did not respond to my request for interviews. However, the literature analysis, reports, and the 
experiences of people that I was able to interview shed light on the functions of MONUSCO and 
its challenges. This was also compensated for through extensive analysis of UN documents. 
Further research must be conducted to understand the effects of liberal peacebuilding in 
other contexts. As the DRC faces new challenges of Kabila’s regime, and the postponement of 
presidential elections within the country, MONUSCO is challenged to formulate new practices, 
operations, and strategies to creating a secure environment for the Congo’s citizens. Therefore, it 
is important to continue research on the tendencies of conflict- prone societies, and the intervention 
methods that are used by organizations to bring sustainable peace. Additionally, this paper unveils 
the need for more research into how and why the UN must change its approach to peacebuilding 
in countries that are in conflict, and not post-conflict states. The DRC is a unique case, but is one 
that can be learned from, and used as an example for developing better strategies. By doing this, 
the UN can restore peace to conflicted states and establish legitimate, sustainable security to the 
Congo and greater international community.  
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